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lntbe 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
N'PATE OF UTAH, 
-vs.-
TO~I~fY" DANKS, 
Respondent, I 
Appellant. ~ Case No. 9127 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PRELI~1INARY STATE~1ENT 
Reference in respondent's brief to the transcript of 
proceedings will be designated by the letter "T" and to 
appellant's brief by the letter "B." 
STATE)1ENT OF FACTS 
Respondent substantially agrees with appellant's 
notation of the facts which were not in dispute but would 
question the characterization by appellant's Brief, of 
~Ir. N e'vbold's condition as "highly intoxicated" and his 
drinking as "heavy." 
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2 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN APPEL-
LANT'S CONVICTION. 
POIN1T II. 
STATE'S EXHIBIT "B" WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED 
IN EVIDENCE. 
POINT III. 
STATE'S EXHIBIT ''C'' WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED 
IN EVIDENCE. 
ARGU!1:ENT 
POINT I. 
THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN APPEL-
LANT'S CONVICTION. 
Appellant correctly states the law to be that when a 
jury has resolved inconsistent and conflicting testimony 
and ·made a determination of facts based thereon, it is not 
the province of an appellate court to alter such determin-
ation. Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co·., 5 U. 2d 187, 299 
P.2d 622; State v. Jarrett, 112 Utah 335, 187 P.2d 547: 
State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402, 131 P.2d 805. 
Appellant seeks to escape the weight of this rule 
by claiming the testimony of the State's witnesses, which 
conflicted with his own, was inherently improbable and 
hence provides a basis for this Court to re-examine such 
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3 
evidence as to weight and reverse the jury verdict which 
was based thereon. 
l~espondent strongly denies that the evidence of the 
prosecution was inherently irnprobable and asserts no 
basis for reversal is thereby provided. Since the 
(1uestion of credibility necessarily involves an examina-
tion of sufficiency as well, respondent will treat the two 
together and shovv that the evidence of the State at trial 
\Va8 both fully probable and entirely sufficient to sup-
port appellant's conviction. 
The narration of ~Ir. Newbold, the victim, supported 
b~T the testin1ony of Mr. McCollum and the Officers, de-
tailed a plausible, credible series of events culminating 
in the crirne of robbery. Mr. Newbold testified that while 
in appellant's apartment after an evening of drinking and 
socializing, appellant struck him, held him at knife point 
and forced him to give up his wallet whereupon, on ap-
pellant's orders, Mr. McCollum removed the money from 
the \vallet and gave it to appellant. (T. 6). The testimony 
of !1r. 1fcCollum substantiates the details of the robbery 
including his own actions. (T. 39, 40). Mr. Newbold fur-
ther testified he was again forced to give up his wallet, 
whereupon appellant cut it in two. (T. 7). The knife and 
the n1utilated wallet were placed in evidence. The police 
officers testified to Mr. N ewhold's injured condition 
w·hen he reported to them, ( T. 56), to being given the 
\Vallet in its severed condition by ~Ir. Newbold (T. 50) and 
to finding the knife in the front room of appellant's apart-
ment. (T. 51, 54, 55). 
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The test of inherent improbability of evidence has 
been well outlined in the case of People v. Moreno, 79 
P.2d 390, 26 C.A. 2d 334 1937, wherein it was stated: 
"Unless the appellate court can say that the 
testimony is so obviously and inherently improb-
able as to leave the court no recourse without self-
stultification, except to reverse the judgment, the 
reviewing court should not interfere with the ver-
dict and the judgment. * * *" 
The court goes on to say that contradictions and incon-
sistencies in the testimony of witnesses alone will not con-
stitute inherent improbability. 
It is with this in mind that appellant's claim of con-
flicts indicating inherent improbability must be examined. 
Appellant first cites the conflict as to the amount 
of money Mr. Newbold had at the time of the robbery. 
Mr. Newbold testified he had between $30.00 and $40.00 
when the crilne occurred. ( T. 7). He also testified that 
he began the evening with $35.00, that he asked his wife 
for an additional $20.00 (T. 9) and later borrowed $20.00 
more from his employer. (T. 13-14). 
Appellant places great stress on the fact Mr. New-
bold is alleged to have stated he had only $5.00 left prior 
to getting $20.00 from his employer (B. 5), in an attempt 
to show he could not have then had $30.00 to $40.00 at the 
evening's end. However, although Mr. Newbold stated 
he may have made such a statement to a companion, Mr. 
Gray, he further testified that he in fact had more than 
$5.00 at that time. (T. 14). Is it "inherently improbable" 
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that the witness may not have wanted Mr. Gray to know 
his exact financial status for some reason~ We think not. 
At page 6 of his brief, appellant stresses that Mr. 
G-ray's testimony "established the fact" that Newbold 
had no money in his wallet and only $5.00 in change prior 
to acquiring $20.00 from his employer, and refers to 
pages 77-78 of the transcript. Examination of these pages 
reveals first that the time Gray sawN ewbold's wallet was 
long after the employer incident and that Gray's testi-
mony "\Vas as follows: 
"A. * * * And Bill had his billfold _out on the table 
with all his papers scattered out there. 
Q. What do you mean by 'papers'~ 
A. Well his driver's license and stuff. All the 
papers that was in the wallet was scattered 
out there on the table and he was looking for 
some money. And this was just, I would say, 
about-oh, 30 seconds before I left. And be-
ing I was sober, I just naturally glanced at 
him as he was looking at the papers, and I 
couldn't see any. 
Q. Any what~ 
A. Any money at all. And so I figured the only 
money he had left was the dollar and what-
ever change he had in his pocket." (Empha-
sis added). (Tr. 78). 
Gray goes on to again make a reference to the $5.00 
shown him earlier prior to the employer's $20.00 loan. 
(T. 78). 
The incident with the wallet did not take place 
just before Newbold saw his employer but was con-
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siderably later as Gray also testified that the $20.00 
loan occurred between 6:30 and 8:00, (T. 74-75), and 
that he left Newbold "about 20 minutes to 12.00" (T. 79). 
The above testimony is totally inadequate to estab-
lish the amount of money Newbold possessed near mid-
night. There was clear uncontested evidence that he 
had a total of $75.00 early in the evening, and the fact 
that Gray "couldn't see any" about 12 P.M. does not 
prove it was not there. State's Exhibit A, Newbold's 
wallet, is a multisectional one with two separate com-
partments for currency, one with a zipper, and four 
other compartments where folded currency could be 
placed. All these would effectively hide currency from 
sight. Also Newbold could have had undetermined 
amounts of money on his person in pockets of clothing 
which could later have been transferred to the wallet. 
This too would have been hidden from Gray's sight. 
The last item of testimony appellant claims con-
flicts with Newbold's estimate of his financial status 
is that of Dennis ~IcCollum wherein he stated the 
Newbold wallet had no money in it. (T. 45). However, 
pages 39-40 of the transcript reveal McCollum testified 
that on app·ellant's orders Newbold took his 'vallet out 
and threw it on the floor and that also on appellant's 
orders he, McCollum, took $30.00 from the wallet and 
gave it to appellant. Newbold also testified (T. 6~7) that 
appellant ordered the wallet taken out and thrown on 
the floor a second time after the money had been 
removed. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
With this background McCollum's testilnony at page 
T. -l-~l does not reveal as to which time the witness 
has reference, in his own mind, when he stated there 
\va~ no 1noney in the wallet. 
Appellant's second contention of conflict creating 
inherent improbability concerns certain discrepancies 
concerning the robbery itself between Newbold's testi-
Inony at trial, his statement to the police and his testi-
tnony at the preliminary hearing and a clarification 
on cross-examination of his testimony as to actually 
seeing his money removed from the wallet prior to 
seeing it handed to appellant. To this appellant adds 
his O"\Vn denial of the testimony against him and offers 
his explanation of the occurrences of that evening. 
It is beyond doubt that some discrepancy did exist 
and that appellant and his wife offered testimony 
directly in conflict with that of the State's witnesses. 
Ho,vever, it has been held, as noted above, that dis-
crepancies and conflicts in the testimony of a ·witness 
are Inatters which affect the credibility of that witness 
and the weight to be given his testimony, and are prop-
erly matters for the jury's determination. State v. Jar-
rett, State v. Lau.b, su-pra. 
It is clear that discrepancies In testimony and 
conflicting testimony from various witnesses fall far 
short of the test outlined in the Moreno case and are 
not sufficient to disturb the findings of a jury who 
\vas present, heard each witness and was hence able 
to evaluate the testimony given. The jury in the instant 
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case was undoubtedly aware of these discrepancies and 
conflicts and was properly instructed thereon by the 
Court in Instruction No. 9 (T. 115 and 116). The jury 
then resolved the conflicts, believing the State's wit-
nesses and not believing those of appellant. It must 
be remembered that every lawsuit is, by its very nature, 
fraught with conflicting testimony, and there must al-
ways be determination as to which is true. 
It is clear that appellant has also failed to meet 
the test of sufficiency set out by this Court in State v. 
Sullivan, 6 U.2d 110, 307 P.2d 212: 
"* * * to prevail on that proposition it must 
appear that, viewing the evidence and all fair 
inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, 
reasonable minds could not believe them guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt * * * ." 
POINT II. 
STATE'S EXHIBIT "B" WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED 
IN EVIDENCE. 
Appellant specifically stated there was no objection 
to this exhibit at the time it was introduced in evidence, 
(T. 69) and failure to do so at that time precludes 
raising such issue on appeal. 3 Am. Jur. 29 states: 
"Where a party has the option to object or 
not as he sees fit, the failu,re to exercise the 
option when the opportunity therefor presents 
itself must, in fairness to the court and to the 
adverse party, be held either to constitute a 
waiver of the right to object, or to raise an 
estoppel against the subsequent exercise thereof." 
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And at page 89 it states: 
Hin order to present to the appellate court 
the question of the propriety of the admission 
of evidence it is necessary that there should 
have been an objection thereto. * * *" 
Even assuming the point to be properly raised, an 
investigation of the record reveals that on page 37 
of the transcript the following testimony of Mr. Newbold 
is recorded, first during re-direct examination by the 
State, and second during a re-cross examination by 
the defense attorney. 
"REDIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Q. Do you know where that knife was at that 
time Mr. Newbold~ 
A. At the time I threw the wallet out there~ 
Q. Yes. 
A. In my ribs. 
RECROSS EXAMINATION. 
Q. You have seen this knife~ Have you seen It 
since~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Since this happened~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were shown and asked if this was the 
knife, and you said it was~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. When was this~ 
A. At the preliminary hearing. 
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Q. That's the first time you'd seen it since the 
night this happened~ 
A. Yes, sir." 
Mr. l\fcCollum testified (T. 40) as follows: 
"Q. Have you seen either the wallet or the knife 
since the happening of the event * * * ~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where~ 
A. At the preliminary hearing. 
Q. Which item did you see~ Or did you see them 
both~ 
A. I seen them both." 
Finally, Officer Butcher testified he took the knife, 
Exhibit B, from the front room of appellant's home at 
the time of the arrest, a few hours after the robbery, 
and that it remained in police custody until the pre-
liminary hearing. ( T. 54, 55). 
This testimony was fully sufficient to identify the 
knife as that used in the crime, and the exhibit was 
properly received in evidence. 
POINT III. 
STATE'S EXHIBIT ''C'' WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED 
IN EVIDENCE. 
Appellant first contends State's Exhibit C, the par-
tially severed ten dollar bill, was not properly identified 
in that only the officer who discovered the bill in the 
possession of appellant's wife and took it into custody 
made the identification. 
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'Ve submit that no more complete identification 
\vas possible or necessary. The officer testified the bill 
was in fact the one he found among the contents of 
1\'lrs. Danks' purse on the night in question and went 
on to describe the circurnstances of its discovery (T. 
49, 50). It is, of course, most difficult to identify with 
ePrtainty a specific piece of currency; however, the 
officer was able to recognize this one because "It was 
ahnost severed in two." ( T. 49). The ten dollar bill, 
having been fully identified, was properly received in 
evidence, its probative value for the jury to deteTmine. 
\Vhile the fact that the wife of a party accused 
of robbery did have some currency with her of the same 
denornination as part of that taken is in no way conclu-
sive and may well be explained away, it does have 
so1ne probative weight, as would a showing that she 
had no such currency have some probative weight vvith 
an opposite effect. Detennination of the implications 
and value of such evidence are properly a jury function. 
Appellant cites the case of People v. Morgan, 321 
P.2d 873, 157 C.A.2d 756, to support his claim that 
failure to tie the currency directly to him was a fatal 
fla\Y in the State's case, and he was prejudiced thereby. 
In the Morgan case, a narcotics sale conviction, the 
only items of demonstrative evidence, the heroin packets, 
\\Tere never connected to the defendant in any way and 
further the procurer of the evidence did not testify 
at all, hence the finding that a fatal gap existed i_n 
the State's case, as there was no direct connection of 
the defendant with the crime. That situation is clearlv 
•-' 
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distinguishable from the instant case where the jury 
heard two eye witnesses, saw the knife, and heard 
testimony as to the victim's condition. The State did 
not rely solely on the ten dollar bill to support its 
case, and the .admission of the currency was proper 
and without prejudicial effect upon appellant. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the admission had 
technically been error, it cannot be said to have been 
prejudicial when view in the light of the mass of 
evidence against the appellant. 
"A judgment will not be reversed because 
of the erroneous admission of evidence, where 
it did not, or probably did not, affect the result, 
conclusion, judgment, or verdict or could not 
have done so,***." (5A C.J.S. 945). 
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·CONCLUSION 
Appellant's charge that the evidence was so In-
herently improbable as to be unbelievable is based 
only on discrepancies and conflicting testimony which 
the jury, fulfilling their traditional function, have laid 
to rest. Their determination, fully supported, as it is 
by substantial evidence, should not be disturbed. 
Further the admission of State's Exhibits "B" and 
.. C" was, in all respects proper and free of error. Ap-
pellant's conviction should therefore be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTE.R L. BUD·GE 
.Attorney General 
RICHARD R. BOYLE 
Assistant Attorne.y General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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